The main independence movement drives Malian forces out of large swathes of territory in an unlikely alliance with a jihadist organisation

An alliance between the leading independence movement in Azawad and a Sahel-based jihadist organisation has expelled the Malian army and the Russian paramilitaries backing it from large areas of this northern Malian territory. The operation is striking in scale: it suggests careful joint planning between sovereigntists and jihadists, deals a heavy blow to Mali’s military junta, and calls into question the real value of Bamako’s rapprochement with Moscow.

What has happened?

On 25 April, the FLA (Azawad independence fighters, mainly Tuareg with some Arab factions) and JNIM (a jihadist coalition) forced Malian troops and the Africa Corps — a Russian state-controlled paramilitary group supporting the junta of Assimi Goïta, Mali’s strongman since the August 2020 coup — out of Kidal. The FLA announced it had “taken” the city in a statement on 26 April, while images circulated showing the withdrawal of Russo-Malian contingents. The Africa Corps has acknowledged the retreat.

On 27 April, footage emerged showing FLA and JNIM control of the town of Tessalit, north of Kidal region. Further south, some reports suggest a Russo-Malian withdrawal from Aguelhok as well.

Why does Kidal matter?

Kidal is one of the nerve centres of Tuareg nationalism and the most important city in the desert north of Azawad. In all four Tuareg rebellions against the Malian state (1962–64, 1990–95, 2007–09 and 2012), the town has played a central role.

Tuareg forces claim that Malian and Russian troops have killed “hundreds” of civilians across Azawad since 2021. The FLA accuses them of further “atrocities”, including the destruction of villages and infrastructure. Human Rights Watch documented the deaths of seven civilians — five of them children — in August 2024 following a Malian drone strike in Tinzaouaten, in Kidal region. Outside the region, Radio France Internationale reported, citing local witnesses, that around ten people were killed by Malian and Russian forces near Gao in 2023.

Kidal is one of Azawad’s provincial capitals, within a vast territory that — according to Tuareg and Arab movements — covers roughly the central and northern two-thirds of Mali. These movements argue the region has been subjected to the “tyranny” of Malian centralism since independence in 1960.

Azawad is not only home to Tuaregs but also to Arabs, Songhai and Fulani populations, all present in its two main cities, Timbuktu and Gao. Support among Songhai and Fulani communities for independence has never clearly materialised.

Kidal region is also a key node along drug trafficking routes crossing the Sahel. The tolls levied along these routes constitute a major source of funding for whoever controls them.

What are the FLA and JNIM?

The FLA (Front de Libération de l’Azawad) is a coalition of several Tuareg political-military factions, along with some Arab groups, founded in November 2024. It is led by Alghabass Ag Intalla, a veteran Tuareg figure who has moved between Tuareg nationalism and Islamism over the years. Its spokesperson is Mohamed Elmaouloud Ramadane, who in a 2025 interview with France 24 described independence as the organisation’s goal, while leaving the door open to “concessions” negotiations within the framework of a negotiation.

Among the groups that gave rise to the FLA are the secular-leaning National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), which proclaimed Azawad’s independence in 2012 and briefly took Timbuktu and Gao, and the Islamist High Council for the Unity of Azawad (HCUA), led by Ag Intalla.

The Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM, by its Arabic acronym) is an al-Qaeda-affiliated jihadist organisation operating mainly in Mali and Burkina Faso. Its ranks include members of Mali’s main communities — Fulani, Songhai, Arab, Tuareg, Bambara and Dogon. Its leader, Iyad ag Ghali, is a Tuareg from the same Ifoghas confederation as Ag Intalla, though from a different branch. Over the years, the two have alternated between rivalry and tactical cooperation in their Kidal stronghold, illustrating the fluid links between the FLA, JNIM and their predecessor organisations.

The FLA has acknowledged that the offensive to retake Kidal was coordinated with JNIM. This pragmatic alliance between independence fighters and Islamists against a common enemy — the Malian army — echoes the one forged in 2012 between the MNLA and Ansar Dine. Then, the MNLA swiftly seized northern Mali and declared Azawad’s independence in April 2012. Within months, however, Ansar Dine — one of the groups that would later form JNIM — sidelined the MNLA, took control of the main cities and imposed a strict Islamist regime, which collapsed in 2013 when Malian forces, backed by France’s Operation Serval, retook the urban centres except Kidal. The Tuareg city, abandoned by jihadists, returned to MNLA control. Given this history and the divergent agendas of the actors involved, it remains unclear how long the FLA–JNIM alliance can endure or how coexistence might function.

What changed after Mali’s 2020 coup?

Since 2020, Mali has moved away from France’s orbit and towards Russia, which has provided heavy weaponry, on-the-ground military support via the Africa Corps, and diplomatic backing. Goïta has framed this pivot as “anti-colonial”, echoing the rhetoric of neighbouring juntas in Niger and Burkina Faso, with whom Mali has formed the Alliance of Sahel States.

Russian support was a key factor enabling Mali’s offensive on Kidal in November 2023, when it recaptured the city from the MNLA.

Two and a half years later, Kidal’s fall — accompanied by the killing of defence minister Sadio Camara in a JNIM attack in Kati, just 15km from Bamako — is a severe setback for this strategy. It underscores that Mali remains unable to prevent a familiar pattern: Tuareg insurgents regaining control over large parts of Azawad, while jihadist groups continue to operate across the country. Indeed, joint action between Tuareg fighters and JNIM has precedent, notably in the battle of Tinzaouaten in July 2024, when they defeated Malian forces and their Russian backers near the Algerian border.

Algeria is watching developments closely. Kidal region stretches along more than half the Algeria–Mali border, and Algiers views stability in Mali as crucial, particularly to prevent the spillover of secessionist tensions and jihadist threats. In 2015, Algerian mediation helped secure a peace deal between the Malian government and Tuareg and Arab armed groups. But relations have deteriorated since 2023, with Mali’s junta accusing Algeria of interference.

In January 2024, Mali’s junta withdrew from the 2015 accords, helping to explain why Azawadian independence armed groups have resumed their offensives against the army. Since then, the two countries have shot down each other’s drones near the border. Finally, this April, Mali recognised Morocco’s sovereignty over Western Sahara — with Rabat offering the Sahelian country investment and a logistical corridor to the Atlantic — a move that has, unsurprisingly, angered Algeria, the main backer of the former Spanish colony’s right to self-determination.

Multiple crises in a complex setting

Events in Azawad reflect the convergence of four interlinked dynamics.

The first is the enduring fracture between centre and periphery: since independence, the Malian state has failed to integrate the north politically or economically, and recurring Tuareg rebellions are the cyclical expression of this failure.

The second is jihadist expansion: JNIM is not merely an imported phenomenon but also a product of the marginalisation of local populations by the Malian state. Its recruitment success among Fulani communities in central Mali is a clear example.

The third is the geopolitical contest playing out in the Sahel, where external powers exploit instability and weak state structures. Alongside Russia, France and Morocco, actors such as China — focused on infrastructure and access to natural resources — and Turkey — also active in infrastructure and a supplier of military drones to Mali — have become increasingly involved.

The fourth dynamic is the involvement of virtually all armed actors in the region — the FLA, JNIM, pro-government militias and even elements of the Malian army — in the struggle to control trans-Saharan routes used for both legal trade and illicit trafficking: drugs (particularly cocaine moving from South America to Europe), arms, fuel and migrants. All derive revenue from these flows, whether directly or through tolls.

Control of Azawad has thus become more than a question of national sovereignty — for both separatists and the Malian state — or religious project, in the case of JNIM. It is also a means of securing economic self-sufficiency and strengthening leverage in any future negotiations.

https://www.nationalia.info/new/11759/the-azawad-board-is-flipped-once-again